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Stimson: Equitable Conversion: Its Application to Contracts for the Sale of Land
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
EQUITABLE CONVERSION: ITS APPLICATION TO
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND IN MONTANA
In a recent Montana decision' the strange and interesting
doctrine of equitable conversion was applied with new vigor
and expanded scope. The litigation grew out of an attempt by
Custer County to tax land which was in the process of being
transferred by the plaintiff owner to the United States. The
matter to be determined was the ownership of this land for
purposes of taxation, on the first Monday in March of 1939,
that day being assessment day. On April 28, 1938, the plaintiff had granted to the United States a written option to purchase the land for a consideration of $53,185.37. The mode of
acceptance of the option by the United States was to be the
mailing or telegraphing of acceptance to the plaintiff within
six months of the date of the option. It was further provided
that the United States should have a reasonable time thereafter
within which to examine the abstract of title which was to be
furnished by the vendor. Other provisions arranged for acquisition of title by condemnation in the event the United States
should decide that the title was not satisfactory. It was also
provided that the United States, after it had accepted the option, was to have the right of possession for the purpose of developing and improving the land; and that the United States
should have the right to enter and remove any materials, equipment or structures placed thereon, in the event title to the
land should not vest in the United States. It was agreed that
the land was to become the property of the United States
"upon the consummation of the contemplated purchase, but
otherwise shall remain the property of and be returned to"'the
plaintiff. The United States was authorized to pay the taxes
and deduct them from the purchase price.! If the property
should be damaged by fire, the loss was to fall upon the plaintiff, and the United States had the right to refuse to accept
conveyance of title. Plaintiff was not to receive the purchase
price until title was approved by a duly authorized representative of the United States.
On June 17, 1938, the United States accepted the option,
and immediately entered into possession and made extensive
improvements. From that day forward the plaintiff was not
'Calvin v. Custer County (1940) 111 Mont. 162, 107 P (2d) 134.
2If this provision refers to taxes which may be assessed at any time
prior to passing of title to the United States, it suggests that the
parties either had no thought of an equitable conversion, or that they
intended that there be no conversion until title was conveyed.
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permitted to use the land or receive any benefit from it. After
the plaintiff had corrected several irregularities in the chain of
title, the deed to the United States was executed and delivered
on November 15, 1939.
The United States, under protest, paid the tax based upon
the assessment as of the first Monday in March, 1939. It assigned to the plaintiff its claim to recover this tax.
The Montana Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Angstman, held that the equitable title or estate was in the United
States on assessment day; and hence, in accordance with the
constitution of Montana,' the property was exempt from taxation.
Before commenting on the procedure by which the Court
hurdled the bars which seemed to stand in the way, it may be
useful to state briefly the generally accepted view of the meaning of the doctrine of equitable conversion and the occasion
for its application.
"Equitable conversion" is said to be a change in the nature of property, whereby realty becomes personalty, or personalty becomes realty.' This alteration in the nature of
property occurs, of course, only in contemplation of law.' The
doctrine is applied, presumably, only for the purpose of promoting justice. Contracts of sale' and positive directions in
wills7 are the common occasions when courts invoke the
equitable conversion doctrine. This comment is concerned with
the former.
The courts, when they invoke this doctrine, use phrases
and statements which have come to be accepted as expressing
what happens and why. "Equity regards as done that which
ought to be done."' If parties have entered into a contract
for the purchase and sale of a specified tract of land, title to
pass at a later date, courts often look at the transaction as
CONST. Art XII, §2: ". . property of the United States
shall be exempt from taxation."
'Beaver v. Ross (1908) 140 Ia. 154, 118 N. W. 287, 289, 20 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 65, 17 Ann. Cas. 640; Bennett v. Bennett (1916) 202 Ill. App.
364; Lockner v. Van Bebber (1936) 364 Ill. 636, 5 N. E. (2d) 460,
461; Woodward v. Ball (1924) 188 N. C. 505, 125 S. E. 10, 11.
'Yerkes v. Yerkes (1901) 200 Pa. 419, 50 A. 186.
'In re Maguire's Estate (1937) 251 App. Div. 337, 296 N. Y. S. 528,
531; Ingraham v. Chandler (1917) 179 Ia. 304, 161 N. W. 434, 435,
L. R. A. 1917D 713; Clapp v. Tower (1903) 11 N. D. 556, 93 N. W.
862, 863.
'In re Dodge's Estate (1929) 207 Ia. 374, 223 N. W. 106, 110; In re Jackson's Estate (1934) 217 Ia. 1046, 252 N. W. 775, 91 A. L. B. 937; In
re Potter's Estate (1938) 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 828, 831, 167 Misc. 848
'Geiger v. Bitzer (1900) 80 Ohio St. 65, 88 N. E. 134, 22 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 285, 17 Ann. Cas. 151.
'MONT.
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already completed, the buyer being the equitable owner of the
land, and the seller the owner of the money which is to be
paid for the land. The circumstances which make possible
this "conversion" will be considered in greater detail later.
In general, the terms of the agreement must be such that the
contract is specifically enforcible against the purchaser. In a
situation where the vendor can not specifically enforce the
contract because of a defect in his title, cases in general hold
that conversion does not take place; or, if it does take place,
it does so only after the defect has been cured.! A few cases
have held that, in the event of default by one of the parties,
there is a "reconversion" to the original status."
Equitable conversion is said to rest upon the right to specific performance. 1 And the unfortunate doctrine of "mutuality of remedy" has been applied by many courts in laying
The so-called muthe foundation for specific performance.
tuality rule has been enacted by statute in Montana." These
matters will be treated later insofar as they are relevant to
the Montana case, which will now be considered in detail.
If the equitable title and the legal title to property are in
different persons, it is the location of the equitable title which
determines the subject of taxation. In approving this view,
the Montana Court cites an earlier Montana opinion: "It is
the situation or character of the beneficial owner, the holder
of the equitable title or estate, and not that of the holder of
the legal title, which determines the question of exemption
from taxation under our constitutional provisions and those
of like import.""
"The ownership of the equitable estate is regarded by
'Ten Eyck v. Manning (1893) 52 N. J. Eq. 47, 27 A. 900; Norris v.
Fox (1891) C. C., N. D. Mo., E. D., 45 F. 406; Verney v. Dodd (1924)
96 N. J. Eq. 129, 125 A. 389; 13 COLUM L. REv. 369, 382.
"Williams v. Haddock (1895) 145 N. Y. 144, 39 N. E. 825; Wells v.
Smith (1833) 2 Edw. (N. Y.) 78 [aff. 7 Paige 22].
""The rule is uniform, we think, that, where a valid and binding contract of sale of land has been entered into, such as a court of equity
will specifically enforce against an unwilling purchaser, the contract
operates as a conversion." Clapp v. Tower 8upra note 6, 864. See 13
COLUM. L. Rav. 369, 386; 40 HAaV. L. RaV. 476, 480.
"58 C. J. 867; Templeton v. Williard (1928) 83 Mont. 317, 321, 272
P. 522.
"R. C. M. 1935, §8716. See Fiedler, Inc. v. Coast Finance Co. (1941)
129 N. J. Eq. 161, 18 A. (2d) 268, 271, 135 A. L. R. 273. A vendor, as
well as a vendee, may maintain action for specific performance of
contract for sale of realty on theory of "mutuality", under which
remedy obtainable by one party is also obtainable by the other. Rice
v. Griffith (1940) 144 S. W. (2d) 837, 842.
"Town of Cascade v. County of Cascade2 (1926) 75 Mont. 304, 243 P.
806. See Kern v. Robertson (1932) 92 Mont. 283, 12 P. (2d) 565, 567.
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equity as the real ownership; and the legal estate is, as has been
said, no more than the shadow always following the equitable
estate, which is the substance.'
The theory of the Montana Court is that the equitable
title to the land in question was in the United States on assessment day, the first Monday of March, 1939. What possible
obstructions stand in the way of this theory?
In the first place, some of the Montana decisions on forfeiture, in contracts of sale where the purchaser has been unable to complete his payments, and a "time is of the essence"
clause has been included, indicate no thought of applying an
equitable conversion doctrine. The Court applies contract law,
and in doing so it has enforced the forfeiture provisions in a
group of leading decisions," despite the statutory provision
for relief in case of forfeiture.1' Justice Angstman, in a case
involving a large forfeiture of payments made on a contract
for the purchase of land, says that "a court may not set aside
the deliberate contracts of parties because time has denominated that the obligation of one of the parties was onerous or
unprofitable. '"
Despite this group of decisions, there are Montana cases
recognizing the doctrine of equitable conversion. Assuming
that the doctrine is to be applied in the present case, when did
the conversion take place?
A Montana decision on the point" would indicate that the
option entered into on April 28, 1938, between the plaintiff and
the United States was not an agreement to sell which could
result in equitable conversion.'
On that day, and during
the interval between that day and June 17, 1938, when the
United States accepted the option, no sufficient finality or
"5Title Ins. Co. v. Duffill (1920) 191 Cal. 629, 218 P. 14. See Norton's
Ex'rs. v. City of Louisville (1904) 118 Ky. 836, 82 S. W. 621; Montgomery v. Wyman (1889) 130 Ill. 17, 22 N. E. 845; People ex. rel.
Williamson County Collector v. City of Toulon (1921) 300 Ill. 408,
133 N. E. 707; Ellsworth College v. Emmett County (1912) 156 Ia. 52,
135 N. W. 594, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 530.
"Fratt v. Daniels-Jones Co. (1913) 47 Mont. 487, 133 P. 700; Estabrook
v. Sonstelie (1930) 86 Mont. 435, 284 P. 147; Clifton v. Willson (1913)
47 Mont. 305, .32 P. 424; Suburban Homes Co. v. North (1914)
50 Mont. 108, 145 P. 2, Ann. Cas. 1917C 81. See Donlan v. Arnold (1914)
48 Mont. 416, 138 P. 775; Edwards v. Muri (1925) 73 Mont. 339, 237
P. 209; Friedrichsen v. Cobb (1929) 84 Mont. 238, 275 P. 267.
" . C. M. 1935, §8658.'
"Estabrook v. Sonstelle, supra note 16, 441.
"Kern v. Robertson, supra note 14. A sale, an agreement to sell, and
an option are clearly distinguished in Ide v. Leiser (1890) 10 Mont.
5, 11, 24 P. 695.
"See 13 COLUm. L. B1y. 369,376; TIFFANY REAL PRoPE'Ty (Abridged Ed.
1940) §211, p. 198.
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consummation of the transaction existed. Until the latter date
it was not certain that the purchase ever would be consummated.
Was an equitable conversion effected at the moment when
the option was accepted by the United States? The Montana
Court holds that there was. It refers to Pomeroy: "A contract
of sale, if all the terms are agreed upon, also operates as a
conversion of the property, the vendor becoming a trustee of
the estate for the purchaser, and the purchaser a trustee of
the purchase-money for the vendor. In order to work a conversion, the contract must be valid and binding, free from
inequitable imperfections, and such as a court of equity will
specifically enforce against an unwilling purchaser.'
It should be noted that Pomeroy says that the contract of
sale must be "such as a court of equity will specifically enforce against an unwilling purchaser.' ' Here the plaintiff
could not bring suit against the United States in the event the
United States chose to be an "unwilling purchaser." Counsel
for the defense used this argument, but the Court gave it little
consideration. "We think," said the Court, "that in determining in whom the equitable interest vested we must treat
the United States as if it were a private person or corporation,
amenable to suit.'

'

The Court cites no precedent to support its position; but
the view is in harmony with cases in which it has been held
that the United States or a state has capacity to act as a trustee' and to enter into contracts,14 even though it can not be
sued without its consent. Reasoning by analogy, it would
seem that the United States might be treated here as though
it were a private corporation amenable to suit. If equitable
conversion would occur under the general circumstances of
this case, the fact that the United States is the purchaser should
not call for a different holding.
Apparently, too, the Court feels that the heart of equitable conversion is the consummation-the settling down into
a final state of equilibrium-of the terms-making or bargaining of the parties. Such an equilibrium was attained at
the moment when the United States accepted the option. This
view would perhaps associate specific performance, conditioned upon mutuality of remedy, with equitable conversion;
"POMEROY EQuirY JuRiS. (5th Ed. 1935)

§1161, p. 479.

'Calvin v. Custer County, supra, note 1, 168.
"Appeal of Yale College (1896) 67 Conn. 237, 34 A. 1036; Bedford v.
99 Ky. 273, 35 S. W. 926.

2 Bedford's Adm'r. (1896)

'Dickinson v. United States (1878) 125 Mass. 311, 314.
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but it would hold that this association is not essential. This
Montana view is interesting and has much to be said in its
favor. From the standpoint of every-day common sense, the
bargain between the plaintiff and the United States was effectuated on the day when the option was accepted. The property was equitably converted. Why insist upon any formal
rule requiring that the purchaser be a party amenable to suit
by the plaintiff?
It is of interest, and perhaps significant, that a Texas
case,' decided three years earlier than the principal case, held
that equitable conversion occurred in a contract for the sale
of land to the United States, with no reference to the fact that
the United States was not amenable to suit.
A further implication of the Montana view of the doctrine of equitable conversion is also found in the Texas case:
"We have concluded that the definite offer of the owners to
sell the lands, and the definite acceptance of the offer of sale
by the United States, to purchase on specified terms, though
modified in some unimportant features of the offer, but on
terms enforcible at law on either side, equitable conversion
was then complete by reason of the sale, regardless of formalities to be performed in carrying out the contract." '
In the principal case, as in the Texas case, the Court refuses to concern itself with such details as the undertaking of
the vendor to furnish a satisfactory abstract of title and the
provision that the United States could not have been compelled to accept the title if it was not satisfactory. The Court
points out that a purchaser, in this kind of contract, will not
be permitted to defend on the ground that he is dissatisfied
with the title, provided the title is such as to satisfy a reasonable man.'
In the minds of the parties in most contracts for the sale
of real property there is probably no thought of an equitable
conversion as such. The court, after examining the situation,
decides whether or not a conversion occurred. Some writers
and some courts have maintained, however, that intention of
the parties as to when transfer of the property actually occurs
should determine the moment of conversion, and that the court
acts in accordance with their presumed intention. This view
is illustrated in the following excerpts:
25Hardcastle et al. v. Sibley et al. (1937) Tex. Civ. App., 107 S. W. (2d)
432.
'wIbid., p. 437.
'Calvin v. Custer County, supra note 1, 168. Support for this view
is found in Ogg v. Herman (1924) 71 Mont. 10, 227 P. 476.
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"The doctrine of equitable conversion rests on the
presumed intention of the owner of the property and on
the maxim that equity regards as done what ought to
be done. "'
"The doctrine of equitable conversion is altogether a
doctrine of equity, and depends wholly upon the rules of
equity. Its real purpose is to give effect to the manifest
intent of a testator or vendor, and to treat that as done
which by will the testator has directed to be done, or that
which, by previous contract with another, both have mutually bound themselves to do.' "'
"The vendor has indicated an intent to convert his
real estate into personalty, and the vendee an intent to
convert personal estate into real estate, and there is no
reason why the intent should not be regarded.""
It has been suggested that in a contract of sale, as with
other contracts, no general rule can be more just than to attempt to follow the intention of the parties; and that when
"by the contract the beneficial incidents of ownership are to
pass is the time which the parties must regard as the moment
of transfer. ""

Mr. Justice Stone has criticized such statements:
"The statement which is so frequently made by writers on the subject that equitable conversion by contract
arises from the 'presumed intention' of the parties is only
another way of saying that it does not rest upon intention
at all, but depends rather upon the operation of rules of
law, regardless of the intent of the owner.'"
Whether courts actually try to determine the intentions
of the parties, or whether they make conversion depend upon
the operation of rules of law without regard to such intentions, it is reasonable to assume that the proximity to a completion of the bargain between the parties is an important
underlying factor in the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion. An examination of the contract of sale in
the Montana case indicates that some of the terms are in
harmony with the view that the parties considered their
transaction as consummated, while other terms could be cited
as evidence to the contrary.
'Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary (1911) 203 N. Y. 469, 480, 97
N. E. 43.
'Ingraham v. Chandler (1917) supra note 6, 306, 307.
See Clapp v. Tower, supra note 6.
'Williston, in 9 HARv. L. REv. 106, 117.
"Ibid., pp. 120-21.
'13 COLum L. REv. 369, 371.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1943

7

Montana Law Review, Vol. 4 [1943], Iss. 1, Art. 9
NOTE AND COMMENT
The provision that the United States, after accepting the
option, was to have the right of possession for the purpose of
developing the project area, suggests a completed transaction.
But the further provision that in the event title to the land
should not become vested in the United States, the United
States was to have the right to enter upon and remove all
equipment, structures, and other property, indicates the possibility of a failure of the conveyance. The Montana Court
seems to emphasize the former provision. It contrasts the
facts of the situation with those of a Georgia case' cited by
the defendants: "That case is distinguishable in that there
the vendors, and not the vendees, had the right to the possession of the land and to the use thereof during the period
in question.""
Another provision of the contract which raises some uncertainty as to whether the transaction was really consummated or not was the fire-loss clause. Such loss was to fall
upon the vendor, and the United States had the right to refuse
to accept conveyance of title; or, if it elected to do so, it could
accept conveyance subject to an equitable adjustment of the
purchase price. If this provision means what it appears to
mean-namely, that the vendor was to bear the risk of loss
until the deed was given to the United States-it suggests that
the parties did not consider the transaction as in any reasonable sense final." And it should be noted that the vendor was
to bear the fire risk even though possession of the property
was to pass to the United States. Such arrangement is unusual.'
Pomeroy points out that many jurisdictions have
adopted the rule that the "loss is placed on the purchaser if,
by the terms of the contract, the equitable or beneficial ownership has passed to the purchaser and if the loss is not due
to a fault of the vendor and the vendor at the time of the
loss is not in default and is able to convey a good title."'
A remaining point of special interest in the Montana case
is the use of the "relation" doctrine. The Court says: "The
subsequent exhibition of the vendor's title relates back to the
date of the execution of the contract. ""
*'Jones v. Morse Bros. Lumber Co. (1931) 171 Ga. 753, 156 S. E. 587.
"Calvin v. Custer County, supra note 1, 170.
"See the view expressed by George L. Clark, 31 HARV. L. REV. 286.
"TFFANY REAL PROPERTY (Enlarged Ed. 1920) I, §126, p. 461.
8See POMEROY EQUITY JURIs, 8upra §1161 a, p. 482; §1406, pp. 1049-50;
13 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 370, 385; 33 HARV. L. REV. 827. See Bautz v.
Kuhworth (1869) 1 Mont. 133.
"Calvin v. Custer County supra note 1, 168-69.
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Earlier Montana cases have been hesitant about applying
this doctrine.' In one case the Court refused to let the relation doctrine deprive a widow of her dower interest. The doctrine was said to be a "fiction of law, applied by courts of
equity in exceptional cases to sustain a conveyance which
would otherwise fail of its purpose, and thus defeat the intention of the parties.' ""
These early Montana cases, which denied the application
of the relation doctrine, have a logical basis for their holding.
The doctrine is a legal fiction which is unnecessary and unfortunate." Conversion either occurs or it does not occur, and
circumstances at the time when the contract comes into existence should be the determining factors. It should not be necessary to judge by some future event whether or not conversion
occurs in the present. To hold otherwise is not only illogical;
it may injure persons who have acquired rights in the meantime.
A consideration of the doctrine of equitable conversion
and the Montana case has served to emphasize the conclusion
that equitable conversion is a nebulous and uncertain doctrine.
To say that equity considers as done that which ought to be
done is, strictly speaking, to say no more than that equity
regards that as done which was agreed or directed to be done
at the time settled upon for performance.'
It has been said
that the shadowy doctrine of equitable conversion has no
substance except as it may be brought in as a "legal reason"
for effecting some practical end, such as preventing a vendor
from conveying away the land before arrival of the time for
the contract purchaser to be given a deed.'
If courts insist upon invoking the doctrine, however, the
Montana case is probably a proper one for its application. The
result attained accords with our sense of justice, in that the
parties appear to have reached a point of almost complete
finality in their transaction when the contract of sale was
signed. The United States received practically all of the
benefits of an owner; and the vendor retained only the legal
title and the right to receive the purchase price. Furthermore,
if a satisfactory title was not procured for the United States,
the United States could obtain the property by exercising the
mChadwick v. Tatem (1890)
Tyler (1914)

9 Mont. 354, 365, 23 P. 729; Tyler v.

50 Mont. 65, 73, 144 P. 1090.

4*Tyler v. Tyler, supra note 39, 73
"See 13 COLum. L. REv. 369, 377.
HARV. L. Rzv. 285n.
Ibid., 285.

4231
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right of eminent domain. That such was contemplated is borne
out by the contract provision that if the United States determines the title to be unsatisfactory it may acquire title by
condemnation, the vendor agreeing to accept the price named
in the contract as the proper amount to be paid to him for all
resulting damages.
-Claude W. Stimson.
DUTY VERSUS PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THE LAW
OF NEGLIGENCE-A COMPARATIVE STUDY
In the law of tort liability, what will be the attitude of the
Montana Supreme Court where defendant's negligent conduct
threatens class A with unreasonable risk of harm, and injury
results instead to B, who is a member of a class outside the zone
of any apparent danger? Such an inquiry is suggested by the
leading case of Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Company.' This case, decided by Justice Holloway in 1909, has been
freely cited in later cases in Montana. In the meantime, Justice
Cardozo has decided the much discussed case of Palsgrafv. Long
Island Railway Company' in the New York Courts. The present
inquiry is directed to an examination and comparison of the
ratio decidendi of these and related cases.
In Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Company, plaintiff's intestate (not a trespasser) was killed while working in
a field some ten miles from a city by coming in contact with a
fence wire. The wire fence had been charged with electricity
by means of the wire of an electric power company, which in
falling upon a telephone wire in the streets of the city, charged
the latter, and it in turn transferred the current through a guy
wire to the fence wire. The Court held that plaintiff might
recover against both the power company and the telephone company because (1) a legal duty was owed the deceased and (2)
the negligence of the defendant power company was the proximate cause of the death. The Court found a "duty enjoined
by the rule which requires everyone to so use his property as not
to injure another." Further, the Court held that electric companies are bound to use reasonable care in the maintenance of
their wires along streets and highways for the protection of persons under the same rule which makes the owner of a vicious
animal liable for the damage it does if negligently allowed to
escape.
'38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971, 129 Am. St. Rep. 659, 16 Ann. Cas. 1189.
'(1928) 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253.
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